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Increasing the Legal Retirement Age: 
The Impact on Wages, Worker Flows and Firm Performance
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Many pay-as-you-go pension systems have increased or plan to increase their legal 
retirement age (LRA) to address the financial consequences of ageing. Although the success 
of these policies is ultimately determined at the labour market, little is known about the effects 
of higher LRAs at the firm level. Here, we identify this effect by considering a legislative 
reform introduced in Portugal in 1994: women's LRA was gradually increased from 62 to 65 
years while men's LRA stayed unchanged at 65. Using detailed matched employer-employee 
panel data and difference-in-differences matching methods, we analyse the effects of the 
reform in terms of a number of worker- and firm-level outcomes. After providing evidence of 
compliance with the law, we find that the wages and hours worked of older women (those 
required to work longer) were virtually unchanged. However, firms employing older female 
workers significantly reduced their hirings, especially of younger female workers. Those firms 
also lowered their output although not their output per worker. 
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Many pay-as-you-go pension systems across the world have been under nancial pressure due
to the combined eects of increased life expectancy and lower fertility rates. Several countries
have responded or plan to respond by adjusting the legal retirement age (henceforth, LRA) -
the age at which workers are entitled to retire.1 Moreover, the age of retirement is also likely
to be suject to further changes due to legislation against age discrimination (e.g. the recent
directives issued by the European Union) which may eventually lead to the abolishment of
mandatory retirement ages.
Although changes in pension systems have typically been studied from the point of view
of their labour supply consequences, there are several reasons why adjustments in retirement
age can also aect rm behaviour and labour demand. For instance, rms may oer incentive
schemes in which wages are below productivity when workers start their careers, and then
gradually increase at a faster pace than productivity (Lazear 1979). In the context of these
incentive pay structures, an ex post increase in the mandatory retirement age would be detri-
mental to rms' protability, particularly in a context of downward wage rigidity or strict
employment protection legislation.
Moreover, rms that are forced to retain workers for a period longer than initially expected
may respond by decreasing their hirings of new sta as the older workers will only need to
be replaced later. In this case, the net eect of higher mandatory retirement ages upon the
sustainability of pay-as-you-go pension systems is weakened. On the one hand, social security
payments made by workers forced to postpone their retirement will increase while pension
outlays will fall. On the other hand, social security payments by workers who are not hired
will presumably fall while unemployment benets may increase.
While it has been established that economic incentives play an important role in retirement
decisions (e.g. Meghir & Whitehouse (1997) nd that increased earnings in work delay job exit
while increased social security benets delay the return to work), very little is known about the
implications of changes in the mandatory age of retirement, particularly at the rm level. The
only related paper we know is Ichino et al. (2007), which argues that increasing the retirement
age helps solve pension problems only if the employment prospects of the elderly do not worsen.
1For instance, Schwarz & Demirgue-Kunt (1999) describe the cases of 17 countries that have increased their
mandatory retirement ages between 1992 and 1998. See also Burtless & Quinn (2002) for an analysis of the
U.S. case.
2Their evidence suggests that, although displaced elderly workers initially lose out in terms
of employment chances, later on there are no signicant employability dierences between
older and younger displaced workers. However, an approach based on displacement cannot
shed much light on the impact of increases in retirement age, when employment protection
legislations are strict as is the case in many countries.2
Our evidence of the eects of higher retirement age is based on a quasi-experiment in-
volving an increase in the legal retirement age: a law introduced in Portugal in 1993 which
increased the mandatory retirement age of women from 62 to 65 years while leaving the corre-
sponding age for men unchanged at 65. Moreover, instead of focusing only on the specic case
of older workers, we pursue a broader analysis of the labour market, namely by considering
several aspects of the personnel policies of rms. Finally, we also examine the consequences
of the reform in terms of rm performance.
Specically, we follow workers and their rms over time and compare them with suitable
`control' groups, based on detailed information about almost all wage earners and rms in the
country. Using treatment eects methods, most notably a combination of the dierence-in-
dierences and matching approaches (Heckman et al. 1997), we analyze the extent to which
the extension of the legal retirement age changed the employment status, hours worked, and
wages of women aected by legislative change. At the rm level, using similar methods, we
study the eect of postponing the legal retirement age upon total hirings, separations, net job
creation, and the hirings of dierent demographic groups. We also consider the eects upon
rm performance.
In our main results, we nd that the wages and hours worked of older women (those
required to work longer) were virtually unchanged. However, rms employing old female
workers signicantly reduced their hirings, especially of young female workers. Those rms
also lowered their output, although not their output per worker.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sketches the Portuguese
pension system, before and after the new law. The econometric methodologies, including the
construction of treatment and control groups, are described in Section 3. We then present
the data in Section 4, while Section 5.1 measures the compliance with the new law. Finally,
Section 5 presents the results and Section 6 concludes.
2See also Ashenfelter & Card (2002), who nd that, in the US dened-contributions setting, the elimination
of mandatory retirement for college and university faculty led to lower retirement rates.
32 The retirement law reform
As in many other countries, the pension system in Portugal is of the dened-benet type, in
which the amount of the pension awarded to an older individual depends on the number of
years the individual worked and on some weighted average of the wages earned throughout
the person's career. The amount of the pension therefore does not depend on the returns to
nancial assets over the period in which the worker made his or her contributions. Moreover,
the funding of these pensions is typically carried out on a pay-as-you-go basis, in which current
workers' contributions are used to pay the benet of current retirees.3
In the early 1990s, the Portuguese pension system was facing the nancial problems typical
of dened-benet pay-as-you-go systems. These problems arose due to population ageing, as a
consequence of higher life expectancy and particularly low fertility rates. In 1993, for instance,
those aged 65 and above corresponded to 21.6% of the working population (Banco de Portugal
1994). As a response to these circumstances, the Portuguese government decided in 1993 to
raise the mandatory retirement age of women from 62 to 65 years (`Decreto-Lei 329/93'), thus
equalising the LRA for men and women.4
The law indicated that the new age of retirement for women would be implemented grad-
ually, presumably to smooth the impact upon the rst cohorts of older women that would be
aected when the reform came into force. Specically, the retirement age for women increased
by six months every year, until it converged in 1999 to the level of men (see Table 1). For
instance, while a woman born on 31st December 1931 would be entitled to retire on 31st
December 1993 (on her 62nd birthday), a woman born one day later, on 1st January 1932,
would only be entitled to receive her pension on 1st July 1994 (when 62 years and six months
old). However, due to the gradual phasing in of the new retirement age, women born six
months later, on 1st July 1932, would reach retirement age on 1st July 1995, i.e. when 63
years old.
There are two additional aspects in the pension system in Portugal that need to be taken
3The main alternative type of pension systems are of the fully-funded, dened-contribution type, when
benets are based on the value of individual accounts to which workers contribute over their active lives.
Dened-contribution pension systems tend to be riskier for individuals, as the value of the account will vary
with uctuations in interest rates. A new, hybrid system is the notional dened contribution type (Barr &
Diamond 2006).
4The nancial and insurance sectors were exempted from this provision of the law and are therefore removed
from our empirical analysis. Moreover, the law also included other provisions, namely by making the formula
that calculated the pension level less generous.
4into account. The rst is that a LRA denotes the age at which a worker is entitled to claim
old-age pension, provided that the worker contributed to the social security system for a
suciently long period. At that point in time, the labour contract established between the
employer and the employee is automatically terminated. However, workers are free to sign
new labour contracts, with the same or dierent employers. Moreover, earnings received from
the new labour contract are not subject to any special taxation related to the amount received
from the old-age pension.
The second aspect to be taken into account is that, as in many other countries, the social
security legislation in Portugal allowed for some exemptions from the standard retirement age.
Such exemptions, leading to early retirement, were typically observed for unemployed workers,
workers in rms undergoing economic turbulence, and in jobs supposed to be particularly
exhausting (e.g. air trac controllers). These exemptions motivate our analysis of compliance
(Section 5.1).
3 Identication and estimation
The feasibility of our evaluation exercise depends crucially on the suitability of the counter-
factual groups that can be generated from the available data. We address this matter by
carefully selecting units for the control group(s) and by using a combination of two method-
ologies typically proposed to tackle non-experimental settings: dierence-in-dierences and
matching (Rosenbaum & Rubin 1983). In particular, we implement a dierence-in-dierences
matching estimator (Heckman et al. 1997), which Smith & Todd (2005) show that may have
the potential benet of eliminating some sources of bias present in non-experimental settings,
improving the quality of evaluation results signicantly.
We take advantage of the characteristics of the dataset and of the new legal framework to
construct treatment and control groups. In particular, we explore (i) the existence of data for
the pre- and post-legislative periods; (ii) the source of variation that the gender-specic law
introduced; and (iii) the availability of a rich set of covariates and of data originating from
the same local labour market (Heckman et al. 1997).
In the limit, the new retirement law will have directly aected all women under the age
of 62 and all rms that employed at least one such woman. Nonetheless, some specic groups
of women were more likely to inuence the rm's response to the new legal retirement age.
5Such women include those who would have reached the legal retirement age in year t+1 had
the LRA remained at its value of year t. For instance, those aged [60; 60.5) by the end of
1992 would have presumably retired in 1994 under the previous age limit (62); however, due
to the increase to 62.5 years, they will have had to postpone their retirement to 1995. We
therefore assign such women (and/or their rms) to our treatment group.
The denition of the treatment group can also be extended beyond the rst cohort of
women aected by the new law. For example, women aged [55;60.5) by the end of 1992 had
to postpone their retirement up to 1999, the year when the retirement age was equalized
across genders. Finally, when analyzing the impact of the increase in the LRA on rm-level
variables, we consider that a rm is a treated unit if it employs at least one of these women.
A related choice that needs to be made concerns the years that correspond to the `before'
and `after' periods. Recall that, starting in 1994, the women's new LRA was increased each
year by six months until it reached (the men's LRA of) 65 years in 1999. Two obvious
candidates for our `before' period are the years of 1992 and 1993. We choose 1992 because
the new law was already under discussion in 1993, which may have prompted individuals and
rms to react in anticipation. On the other hand, the government policy was unknow in
1992 and, therefore, that year should not suer from any anticipation eects. Therefore, our
main treatment group in the `before' period includes all women aged [57.5; 60.5) (worker-level
analysis) or rms with at least one woman in this age range (rm-level analysis) - see rst
column in Table 1.
Regarding the non-experimental control group, we adopt two denitions, depending on
whether we are conducting an individual- or rm-level analysis. In the former case, we consider
as our control the group formed by men in the same age group as the women included in the
treatment group. As men's LRA was already 65 years when the new law came into eect
over the 1994 to 1999 period, we can construct comparable control groups in this age-related
dimension. Of course, this control group raises gender-related issues. These are, however,
mitigated if we are willing to accept the time-invariance hypothesis of the D-in-D estimator
(discussed in the next section). In other words, if the gender gap is constant over the analysis
period, using men as control for women is less of an issue. Indeed, the data seems to support
this hypothesis. Between 1991 and 1993, the log dierence of worked hours between men and
women was 0.098, 0.093 and 0.10, while the log dierence of total remuneration was 0.39, 0.39
6and 0.38; these values are also statistically (and economically) constant over time.
At the rm-level analysis (hirings, separations, net job creation and rm performance),
we consider dierent control groups, based on whether rms employed in 1992 any women
aected by the new law. For instance, one possible control group is made up of rms that do
not employ any woman aged [60; 60.5) in 1992. In this case, the corresponding treatment group
would be rms that employ at least one such woman in 1992. We then consider alternative
treatment/control groups by broadening the range of ages that lead to the assignment of rms
into each group. The broadest age range corresponds to rms that employ or do not employ
any woman aged [55; 60.5) in 1992.
Besides any gender-related issues that may arise, the non-random assignment of the quasi-
natural experiment may raise questions about selection into treatment status. These, as far
as they are imputable to observables, can be handled by the matching methodology. To
address dierences between the two groups due to time-invariant non-observable factors, we
combine both D-in-D and matching strategies (Heckman et al. 1997, 1998), the so-called D-
in-D matching estimator. This and other aspects of our methodology are described in more
detail in Appendix A.
4 Data
We use two datasets in our analysis. To study the issues of labour income, working hours,
worker ows and rm performance, we use Quadros de Pessoal, a matched employer-employee
panel data set. The impact on labour market transitions are analyzed with a quarterly
employment survey, Inqu erito ao Emprego.
4.1 Quadros de Pessoal
The main data source used in this paper is Quadros de Pessoal (QP), a longitudinal dataset
matching rms and workers based in Portugal. The data are gathered every year by the
Ministry of Employment and Social Security, based on a census of rms that employ at least
one employee. Reported data cover all personnel working for the rm/establishment in a
reference month (March, up to 1993, and October, from 1994).
Personnel on short-term leave (such as sickness, maternity, strike or holidays) are also
included, whereas personnel on long-term leave (such as military service) are not reported.
7Civil servants, the self-employed and domestic service are not covered, and the coverage
of agriculture is low given its low share of wage-earners. Reported data include the rm's
location, industry, employment, sales, ownership, legal setting, and the worker's gender, age,
skill, occupation, schooling, hiring date, earnings, work duration, etc.
The mandatory nature of the survey leads to an extremely high response rate. Given the
nature of the dataset, which covers not just every company with wage-earners, but also all
of its workers, problems commonly faced by panel data sets, such as under- or over-sampling
of certain groups and panel attrition, are much attenuated. Also, employer-reported wage
information is known to be subject to less measurement error than worker-reported data.
Each rm entering the database is assigned a unique identifying number, in such a way
that it can be followed over time. The Ministry of Employment implements several checks
to ensure that a rm that has already reported to the database is not assigned a dierent
identication number. Similarly, each worker also has a unique identier, based on his/her
social security number.
4.2 Inqu erito ao Emprego
Our second dataset is taken from the nationally representative Portuguese quarterly employ-
ment survey, Inqu erito ao Emprego (IE), conducted by Instituto Nacional de Estat stica, the
Portuguese statistics agency. We use data for the period 1992(2)-2000(4). In addition to em-
ployment status, the employment survey contains information on the individual's age, gender,
schooling, etc.
The survey has a quasi-longitudinal nature: one sixth of the sample rotate out of the
sample each quarter, so that we can track transitions from employment for up to ve quar-
ters. Transition rates are then obtained simply by identifying those employed individuals in
the survey, who move out of employment over the subsequent quarter. In this paper, we dis-
tinguish between two destinations: unemployment and economic inactivity (i.e., withdrawal
from the labour force).
The main restrictions imposed on the data set were that the individual be employed at
the time of the survey, aged older than 55, and resident in mainland Portugal. Finally, due
to potential sample attrition, we ensured that individuals appearing in subsequent surveys
with the same identier were in fact the same individual. The resulting sample size is 229,066




A common concern with the measurement of treatment eects is the eectiveness of the quasi-
experiment. In other words, one needs to know how far reaching is the impact of the legislative
change, particularly in a context in which early retirement is observed. In order to evaluate
the eect of the new law on the labour force status of aected women we use the Inqu erito
ao Emprego data and specify conventional logit models to estimate the probability of being
employed and the probability of being inactive. Based on time of the survey and on the age
and gender of the individuals, we dened a dummy variable identifying the women likely to
be aected by the change in the legislation. More specically, this variable takes value one for
women aged 62 to 62.5 years in 1994, for women aged 62 to 63 in 1995, and so on up to 1999,
when the dummy is one for women aged 62 to 65. We called this variable the `Treatment
Group'.
The estimation results are provided in Table 2 where it can be seen that the probability
of being employed for the treated group of women increased sizeably. According to the logit
estimates, the odds ratio associated with the treatment group is 1.313, meaning that it is 31.3
percent more likely for a women aected by the increase of the retirement to be employed.
Symmetrically, the probability of being inactive decreased signicantly among the treated
women, where the decline is estimated to be around 27.9 percent. The overall picture from
these two logit regressions is that the new retirement age rules had a visible impact in the
labour force status of aected women.
We also provide a more complete picture of the labour market changes that emerge from
postponing the retirement age by looking at transitions out of employment. Since the Por-
tuguese employment survey has a quasi-longitudinal nature, one can track transitions between
labour market states for about ve sixths of the sample. In particular, one can spot transitions
from employment into inactivity among individuals who are old enough to consider retirement.
Based on the age of the individuals, one should expect to see an increase in the hazard rate
9for women aected by the change in the legislation. This is indeed what is obtained from the
estimation of a Cox proportional hazards model, where the time of the implementation of the
new law (the `After' variable in the specication) is treated as a time-varying covariate. The
indication provided in Table 3 is that the hazard rate more than tripled among the aected
women.
5.2 Worker-level analysis: eects on wages and working hours
In Table 4, we present a set of dierence-in-dierences matching (DDM) estimates for the
eect of the treatment on the treated for total wages, working hours, and the probability of
absence from work. The general result that emerges is that the impact of the increase of
the mandatory age of retirement on these women's labour market outcomes are negligible.
Neither income, nor working hours were aected by the extension of the working age. Also,
the probability that a woman is an absentee, which could admittedly increase when requiring
women to stay employed beyond their initial expectations, is not aected.
Before we discuss in more detail these DDM estimates, we shift our focus to the choice
of the covariates used in the estimation of the propensity score and also to the plausibility
of the assumption underlying the matching estimator. The choice of the variables in the
specication of the probit model observed the basic principle that they should inuence both
the selection-into-treatment (to remain on the job) and the outcome variables. Thus, the
variables included (see Table 5) are: potential experience and current job tenure and their
quadratic terms, year dummies and (log) sales - to control for economy-wide and rm-specic
shocks -, education level dummies, and sector of activity and regional dummies.5 While
the latter two sets of variables might inuence more the outcome variable, clearly the other
variables are simultaneously important in determining the decision to remain employed and
the outcome variable.
The focus of Table 5 is, however, on the balancing properties of the matching procedure.
For this purpose, we present a plethora of statistics, namely, the mean for the treatment
and control groups for the unmatched and matched samples, the standardized bias measure
suggested by Rosenbaum & Rubin (1985), and the joint signicance tests and pseudo-R2
5This table refers only to the propensity score matching procedure for the `after' period. Similar testing
schemes were conducted for the other components of the DDM estimator with overall results qualitatively
identical. The full set of results is available from the authors upon request.
10of the propensity score (probit model) estimation (Sianesi 2004). This table illustrates the
importance of matching and its success. While before the kernel-based matching procedure
the treatment and control groups exhibited clear dierences (e.g. tenure diered by about
2 years), after matching these dierences are reduced to statistical insignicance. This is
also conrmed by the reduction obtained in the standardized bias and, nally, by the joint
statistical signicance of the covariates and by the pseudo-R2 of the propensity score in the
unmatched and matched samples estimation procedures. As it can be seen in the last two
rows of Table 5, the pseudo-R2 in the propensity score estimation that used only the treated
units and the corresponding matched control units falls to values close to zero. The F-
test complements this information, corroborating the view that matching has successfully
eliminated any systematic observable dierences between the treated and control groups.
With regards to the DDM estimates, we present two estimates, depending on the use of
unbalanced panel data (which we treat as repeated cross sections) or balanced panel data.
The researcher has typically these two options, and the choice of one over the other hinges
on the question to be answered. In the present case, as women had access to early retirement
schemes, one cannot exclude the possibility that, faced with unexpected extensions of their
careers, some of them opted for such retirement schemes. Thus, by opting for the balanced
panel data, we are in fact looking exclusively over time at those who (as expected by the
legislator) extended their careers. For the present case, Table 4 reports these alternative
estimates and both are statistically not dierent from zero.
To check on the sensitivity of our point estimates to the denition of the non-experimental
control group, we consider two alternative denitions of control units. The obvious choice to
compare women would be other women. This, however, raises diculties in the current setting
because all women younger than 62 years were aected by the new legislation. Therefore, we
have one obvious choice - women older than 62 in 1993 - and a less obvious and, indeed
potentially endogenous choice - younger women who did not have to postpone retirement in
the 1994-1999 transition period. The last column of Table 4 presents the results. We nd
that the conclusions do not depend on the choice of the control group. Neither income, nor
working hours were aected by the postponing of the retirement age. The same is true for
the probability of being absent from work.
115.3 Firm-level analysis: eects on job and worker ows
We begin our rm-level analysis by studying the eects of the reform in terms of three main
dierent labour market variables: hirings, separations, and net job creation. Net job creation
in year t is dened as the dierence in the total number of workers between year t and year
t 1 in each rm. Hirings at year t are dened as the number of workers that are hired since
year t up to year t   1. Separations are dened as the dierence between hirings and net
job creation.6 Finally, in order to shed more light into any possible patterns resulting from
the change in retirement age, we also decompose the total level of hirings into four groups of
workers. These groups are dened according to the gender and the age (25 or younger; and
older than 25) of the worker hired.
Because we are interested in understanding the net impact of the reform, all variables
(hirings, separations and net job creation) are considered in a cumulative way when they refer
to the `after' period. Specically, each variable results from summing the ow of the year
under analysis and the ow of the same variable for all previous years in the treatment period
up to that year under analysis. For instance, when we refer to the impact on hirings in 1997,
we are comparing the sum of hirings in 1995, 96 and 97 in the treated group with the same
sum for the control group.
Our models are estimated in within-rm dierences, by taking as the dependent variable
the dierence between the value of the variable for each year and the value of the same variable
in 1992. The matching method used is kernel matching.7 We also impose the common support.
The propensity score are estimated using a very large set of variables: a cubic in rm size
(measured in terms of the number of workers), ve dummies for rm size ranges, a quadratic
in the share of women in the workforce, a cubic in the average total pay per worker, a cubic
in the average total number of hours worked, a quadratic in the percentage of workers that
are men aged 60 or more, the shares of voting rights held by domestic (private) and foreign
investors, 57 industry dummies and 29 region dummies.
The sample is also restricted to rms with 100 or fewer employees, as large rms that
employed older women were very dicult to match - it is dicult to nd large rms that do
6Our method of counting worker ows based on annual data implies that we may underestimate hirings
and separations, as we cannot track workers that are hired after the census month in year t   1 and that then
separate before the census month in year t. However, these short-term ows are not important from our point
of view in this paper.
7We have checked the robustness of the results using nearest neighbour matching and the results (available
upon request) are very similar.
12not employ at least one woman aected by the new LRA. This restriction eliminates only less
than 2% of our sample, given the relatively low average size of rms in Portugal. We also
checked that our results are robust to other cut-o thresholds (results available upon request).
We then consider three dierent periods over which we carry out this aggregation of ows:
only 1995 (the rst year that falls exclusively during the `after' period), 1995 to 1997 and 1995
to 1999. These periods have been chosen in order to establish a correspondence between the
dierent criteria that assign rms to either the treatment or the control groups. As mentioned
before, strictly speaking all rms with at least one female employee in 1992 will be (directly)
aected by the increase of the mandatory age of retirement, to the extent that, under the new
law, such rms will be forced to retain those workers for a longer period than expected when
the worker was hired.
Table 6 present the results concerning the impact of the higher LRA in terms of rm-
level job and worker ows. In this and the following tables, the column indicating the period
to which the estimate refers also indicates the criterion adopted to dene the control and
treatment groups. The correspondence between the period range examined and the denition
of the treatment group is designed to allow us to study the impact on worker ows over the
same period in which the law was binding in terms of preventing the older women employees
from retiring. For instance, estimates for the period 1995-99 are also based on a treatment
group made up of rms that employed in 1992 at least one woman aged 55 to 60 (while
the control group corresponds to rms that employed zero women aged 55 to 60 in 1992).
Similarly, estimates for 1995-97 are based on treatment group rms employing at least one
woman aged 57-60 in 1992. Finally, estimates for 1995 only are based on treatment groups
rms employing at least one woman aged 59-60 in 1992. Also, recall that each row corresponds
to a separate estimate from a dierent matching analysis.
The main result that emerges from these tables is that hirings and separations fall sig-
nicantly for treated rms. For instance, when considering the impact of the new law upon
cumulative hirings over the 1995-99 period, the estimated eect is -1.26 (t-ratio of -3.02).
A similar comparison in the case of cumulative separations, again over the 1995-99 period,
indicates an estimate of -1.28. Given the similarity of the two eects, the cumulative net job
creation eect is virtually zero.
Another important result from Table 6 is that wider periods of analysis and wider deni-
13tions of the treatment group translate into bigger eects. For instance, the eect on hirings
goes from -0.52 in 1995 to -1.26 in 1995-99. In order to place these and other estimates in
context, it is important to mention that, in each treated rm in 1992, the number of older
women (old enough to assign the rm to the treatment group) is between around 1 (1995)
and around 1.5 (1995-99 period). We conclude from this analysis that the new law had the
eect of decreasing hirings by about one worker for each older worker retained in the rm.
In terms of separations, the range of relative eects (change in separations per retained
worker) is broadly similar, again supporting the one-to-one relationship expected given the
earlier evidence that the law was binding. Moreover, given the identity connecting hirings,
separations and net job creation, the latter is hardly changed in the treatment group with
respect to the control group, as documented in our results. As we mentioned above, we also
nd that, the longer the time range considered (e.g. 1995-1999 vs. 1995 only), the stronger
the relative impact of the law in terms of decreased hirings, separations, or net job creation.
We also carry out balancing tests for our estimates, in order to check some of the assump-
tions underlying the matching method. We nd that the matched sample leads to a much
greater equality of the observables across the treatment and the control groups. In the few
cases that the t-test of the equality of the means of the two groups is rejected at the standard
levels of signicance, the economic dierence between the two groups is particularly small
(results available upon request).
5.4 Firm-level analysis: eects on rm performance
As argued above, it is possible that rms' performance is negatively aected by the additional
constraint imposed on their personnel policies when the LRA is increased. We assess this
hypothesis by extending the framework we used for job and worker ows, considering now
the impact of the treatment in terms of dierent measures of rm performance, namely sales
and sales per worker.8 Unlike before, each one of these variables is now measured in a single
period (the last year of the range of years considered for the denition of the treatment/control
groups).
We nd - Table 7 - that there are relatively large and reasonably signicant eects in
terms of sales. The gures, across the dierent specications and estimation methods, range
8We also consider sales net of the wage bill with very similar results, available upon request.
14between -0.03 and -0.08 for the 1995 and 1995-1999 periods, respectively, always with t-ratios
above 1.4. However, when considering the eects in terms of sales per worker, we nd no
signicant dierences between the treatment and the control groups (eects ranging from
-0.02 for 1995 to 0 for 1995-1999).
5.5 Firm-level analysis: robustness
As mentioned above, we decompose the eect of the law upon hirings in terms of four dier-
ent demographic groups (female workers aged 25 or less, male workers aged 25 or less, female
workers aged 26 or more, male workers aged 26 or more) that may have been aected dier-
ently. The results are presented in Table 8. The results - Table 8 - indicate that the negative
eect upon hirings is concentrated upon younger workers and, in particular, upon younger
women. Bearing in mind that the total eect upon cumulative hirings from 1995 to 1997 was
-1.26 (t-ratio of -3.02) - 6 -, the eect upon hirings of women aged 25 or less is of -0.45 (t-ratio
of -3.23). On the other hand, the eect upon hirings of men aged 25 or less is only -0.29
(t-ratio of -2.83) and the eects upon women and men older than 25 are, respectively, -0.36
(t-ratio of -2.88) and -0.17 (t-ratio of -1.16).
With respect to the benchmark results on job and worker ows amd rm performance,
the ndings are also remarkably similar for dierent samples and matching methods. For
instance, we also consider a dierent sample denition, of only rms present in all years since
1991 until 1999 (Tables 9 and 10). The advantage of this denition is that it rules out any
possible impacts of compositional changes in the pool of rms analysed, as the same rms are
followed over time, although at the cost the representativeness of the sample.
6 Conclusions
Increasing the mandatory retirement age has been considered an important policy to improve
the nancial sustainability of pay-as-you-go, dened-benet pension systems in a context of
population ageing. Although the success of any such policy is essentially determined at the
labour market, our paper is the rst to examine how rms adjust their personnel policies
when forced to retain their older workers longer than initially expected.
We present quasi-experimental evidence on such response by rms, by examining the im-
pact of a 1993 law in Portugal that increased the retirement age of women while leaving
15unchanged the retirement age of men. Using matched employer-employee panel data and
dierence-in-dierences matching methods, we compare rms that, before the law was an-
nounced, employed women old enough to be either immediately or soon after aected by the
new law with otherwise very similar rms but that did not employ any such women.
After checking that rms did indeed comply with the law, we nd that the wages and the
hours of the aected women were virtually unchanged. Moreover, we also nd that `treated'
rms signicantly reduced their worker ows (hirings and separations). In our preferred
specications, the results indicate that rms hire approximately one fewer worker for each
older worker that is retained due to the higher mandatory retirement age. Moreover, we also
nd that younger workers and, in particular, younger women are the demographic groups
most aected by the lower level of total hirings; and that rm sales fall but not sales per
worker.
The result about fewer hirings suggests that the contribution of higher retirement ages to
the sustainability of pensions may be weaker than previously assumed, at least over the short
run.
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17A Appendix - Econometric implementation
Let Y D
it be the potential outcome of interest for individual i at time t had (s)he been in state
Di, where Di = 1 if exposed to the program and 0 otherwise. Let treatment take place at
time t. The fundamental identication problem lies in the fact that we do not observe, at
time t, individual i in both states. Therefore, we cannot compute the individual treatment
eect, Y 1
it   Y 0
it. One can, however, if provided with a convenient control group, estimate the
average eect of the treatment on the treated.
The idea behind a D-in-D estimator is that we can use an untreated comparison group
to identify temporal variation in the outcome that is not due to the treatment. However, in
order to achieve identication of the general D-in-D estimator we need to assume
E[Y 0
it   Y 0
it0 j Di = 1] = E[Y 0
it   Y 0
it0 j Di = 0]; (1)
where t0 is a time period before the program implementation. The assumption states that,
over time, the outcome variable of treated individuals (D = 1), in the event that they had not
been exposed to the treatment, would have evolved in the same fashion as actually observed
for the individuals not exposed to the treatment (D = 0), known as the time invariance
principle.
If the assumption expressed in (1) holds, the D-in-D estimate of the average treatment
eect on the treated can be obtained by the sample analogs of
b D-in-D = fE[Yit jDi = 1]   E[Yit jDi = 0]g   fE[Yit0 jDi = 1]   E[Yit0 jDi = 0]g: (2)
The time invariance assumption can be too stringent if the treated and control groups
are not balanced in covariates that are believed to be associated with the outcome variable.
The D-in-D setup can be extended to accommodate a set of covariates and this is usually
done in a linear way, which takes into account eligibility specic eects and time/aggregate
eects. In the following model, b D corresponds to the D-in-D estimate obtained on a sample
of treatment and control units
Yit = Di + t + 0Zit + DDit + "it; (3)
where Di is as before and represents the eligibility-specic intercept, dened over age and
gender according to treatment rules, t captures time/aggregate eects and equals 0 for the
`before' period and 1 for the `after' period, and Z is a vector of covariates included to correct
for dierences in observed characteristics between individuals in treatment and control groups.
This estimator controls for both dierences in the Zs and for time-specic eects, but it
does not allow D to depend on Z and it does not impose common support on the distribution
of the Z0s across the cells dened by the D-in-D approach (namely, before and after, and
treatment and control). Additionally, this procedure might be inappropriate if the treatment
has dierent eects for dierent groups in the population.
These pitfalls can be overcome by supplementing the D-in-D estimates with propensity
score matching. The dierence-in-dierences matching (DDM) estimator adds to the sim-
ple D-in-D estimator the comparability on the observable covariates that characterizes the
propensity score matching estimator.
The feasibility of the matching strategy relies on a rich set of observable individual char-
acteristics, Z, to guarantee that the distribution of the individual characteristics important to
each evaluation exercise is the same in the dierence-in-dierences cells. The matching pro-
cess models the probability of participation and matches individuals with similar propensity
scores. The time invariance assumption for the DDM estimator is
18E[Y 0
it   Y 0
it0 j p;Di = 1] = E[Y 0
it   Y 0
it0 j p;Di = 0]; (4)
where p = Pr(D = 1jX) is the propensity score. When estimating the mean impact of the


















and also requires that there is a nonparticipant analogue for each participant which means
that Pr(D = 1jZ) < 1.
The DDM estimator takes two forms, depending on the nature of the data, namely, bal-
anced panel data or repeated cross-sections. For the former case,
b DDM = E
h
(Y 1
t   Y 1
t0)   b E
 
Y 0




where b E (Y jP) represents the expected outcome of individuals in the control group matched
with those in the treatment group. In the case of the repeated cross-section, the DDM takes
the form of
b DDM = E
h
Y 1














where all variables are as above. We use both estimators.
19Tables
Table 1: Treatment groups: Before and after the new retirement age
Treatment groups by age sets (Before=1992)
Year: 1992 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
LRA: 62 62.5 63 63.5 64 64.5 65
[57.5, 58) [64.5, 65)
[58, 58.5) [64, 64.5)
[58.5, 59) [63.5, 64)
[59, 59.5) [63, 63.5)
[59.5, 60) [62.5, 63)
[60, 60.5) [62, 62.5)
Notes: (1) Treatment group: The set of individuals (women) who would have retired in year t
if the legal retirement age (LRA) had remained at its value of year t 1. For example, women
in the age group [60, 60.5) in 1992 would have retired in 1994 if the LRA had remained at
62 years; (2) Before period: the `before' is always set to 1992, when the women's LRA was
62 years and no legislative change was expected.
20Table 2: labour Force Status: 1992-2000 or 1992 and 2000 only (Logit results)
Labour Force Status: Labour Force Status:
Regressor Employment Inactivity Employment Inactivity
Gender (Female=1) -1.242 1.333 -1.289 1.355
(0.010) (0.010) (0.021) (0.021)
Age Group -0.047 0.072 -0.108 0.139
(0.028) (0.028) (0.061) (0.061)
Treated Group 0.272 -0.327 0.389 -0.420
(0.031) (0.031) (0.067) (0.068)
Number of observations 229,066 229,066 49,701 49,701
Wald test 28,553.6 31,525.4 6,158.3 6,636.2
Source: Inqu erito ao Emprego. The specication in-
cludes 17 age and 8 year dummies (pr one year dummy
in the case of the last two columns). Standard errors in
parenthesis.







Age Group  Female -0.311
(0.177)
Age Group  After -0.220
(0.210)
Age Group  After  Female 0.724
(0.309)
Number of observations 1,167
Wald test 47.3
Source: Inqu erito ao Emprego. The specication in-
cludes 8 year dummies. Standard errors in parenthesis.
22Table 4: Labour market outcomes: Impact on postponed women retirees' total income, work-
ing hours and probability of working






(4) c. sect. panel c. sect. panel
Log earnings 0.008 -0.015 0.005 0.008 0.029 -0.023 -0.005 -0.003
(0.013) (0.010) (0.015) (0.011) (0.015) (0.022) (0.015) (0.011)
52,120 52,120 53,570 10,204 38,067 4,953 53,586 6,788
0.08 0.44 - - - - - -
Log hours -0.033 -0.028 -0.026 0.009 0.019 0.006 -0.026 -0.010
(0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.009) (0.013) (0.016) (0.010) (0.009)
50,628 50,628 52,166 9,823 39,274 5,041 52,178 6,850
0.04 0.08 - - - - - -
Pr(Absentee)
(5) - - -0.011 - -0.015 - -0.011 -
- - (0.009) - (0.009) - (0.009) -
- - 66,811 - 57,114 - 66,815 -
- - - - - - - -
Notes: The values reported for each pair variable and estimator are point estimate, standard er-
ror, number of observations and R
2. (1) The D-in-D unrestricted estimator does not control for
confounding factors; (2) The OLS D-in-D restricted estimator is based on a linear specication, con-
trolling for observable characteristics; (3) DDM estimator with kernel matching on the propensity
score with repeated cross-section data; (4) DDM estimator with kernel matching on the propensity
score with balanced panel data. The set of variables used with the estimation of the propensity score
and in the restricted OLS D-in-D estimator are reported in Table 5. (5) It refers to the probability
that a employee although registered in QP is reported as having worked zero hours, and (s)he is
taken as absentee.
23Table 5: Balancing properties of the kernel based propensity score matching for the unbalanced
panel data in the after period
Unbalanced panel data (as repeated cross-section)
After
Mean t-test Reduction
Variable Sample Treated Control p-value
(1) % bias
(2) jbiasj
Experience Unmatched 52.44 52.19 0.000
Matched 52.43 52.34 0.163 3 62.6
Experience
2 Unmatched 2759.20 2734.40 0.000
Matched 2758.40 2749.30 0.162 3 63.2
Tenure Unmatched 15.58 17.80 0.000
Matched 15.60 15.51 0.704 0.8 95.6
Tenure
2 Unmatched 381.64 484.89 0.000
Matched 382.44 382.51 0.994 0 99.9
Total sales Unmatched 7.02 7.78 0.000
Matched 7.03 7.09 0.227 -2.5 92.1
Education:
High school Unmatched 0.03 0.03 0.093
Matched 0.03 0.04 0.739 -0.8 73.9
College Unmatched 0.03 0.04 0.001
Matched 0.03 0.03 0.402 -1.7 71.2
Year dummies:
1994 Unmatched 0.17 0.18 0.191
Matched 0.17 0.16 0.471 1.5 33.6
1995 Unmatched 0.20 0.20 0.603
Matched 0.20 0.20 0.765 -0.6 29.5
1996 Unmatched 0.14 0.15 0.006
Matched 0.14 0.14 0.746 -0.7 86
1997 Unmatched 0.18 0.17 0.071
Matched 0.18 0.18 0.824 0.5 84.6
1998 Unmatched 0.15 0.14 0.246
Matched 0.15 0.15 0.818 -0.5 75.1
1999 Unmatched 0.17 0.16 0.107
Matched 0.17 0.17 0.909 -0.2 91.1
Observations:
On common support 4,324 13,259









Joint F-test, p-value 0.000 0.998
Notes: The table does not exhaustively list all variables included in the probit model used to estimate the
propensity scores; we omit from the table the balancing property of sector of activity and regional dummy
variables. (1) The p-value of the t-test for the equality of means in the treated and control groups, both before
and after matching. (2) Bias is the standardized bias as suggested by Rosenbaum & Rubin (1985) reported
together with the achieved percentage reduction in jbiasj. (3) Pseudo R
2 from the probit model estimation of
the propensity scores, including all variables reported above, before and after the matching process (Sianesi
2004).
24Table 6: Eects on Flows, Probit Pscore, Pooled Data
Year ATT t(ATT) Size Treated Control
Hirings
1995 -0.52 -2.27 21.1 5870 59051
1995-97 -0.67 -2.36 21.8 4937 48172
1995-99 -1.26 -3.02 22.0 4409 43025
Separations
1995 -0.81 -3.57 21.1 5870 59051
1995-97 -1.04 -3.27 21.8 4937 48172
1995-99 -1.28 -2.85 22.0 4409 43025
Net job creation
1995 0.30 1.37 21.1 5870 59051
1995-97 0.37 1.19 21.8 4937 48172
1995-99 0.02 0.07 22.0 4409 43025
Notes: Source: Own calculations based on Quadros de Pessoal. ATT refers to the average treatment
eect in terms of the worker ow considered and at the year under analysis. t(ATT) denotes
analytical standard errors. Estimation is carried out using xed eects. Estimates are based on the
dierence in the accumulated level of the worker ows from 1995 until the year under analysis and
the base year, 1992. Treatment and Control indicates the number of rms assigned to the treatment
and control groups respectively.
25Table 7: Eects on Sales, Probit Pscore, Pooled Data
Year ATT t(ATT) Size Treated Control
Sales
1995 -0.03 -1.77 21.4 5165 50694
1995-97 -0.03 -1.45 21.6 4365 42468
1995-99 -0.08 -3.39 22.1 3974 38187
Sales per worker
1995 -0.02 -1.30 21.4 5165 50694
1995-97 0.00 0.07 21.6 4365 42468
1995-99 0.00 0.13 22.1 3974 38187
Notes: Source: Own calculations based on Quadros de Pessoal. ATT refers to the average treatment
eect in terms of the worker ow considered and at the year under analysis. t(ATT) denotes
analytical standard errors. Estimation is carried out using xed eects. Estimates are based on the
dierence in the accumulated level of the worker ows from 1995 until the year under analysis and
the base year, 1992. Treatment and Control indicates the number of rms assigned to the treatment
and control groups respectively.
26Table 8: Eects on Hires by Demographic Group, Probit Pscore, Pooled Data
Year ATT t(ATT) Treated Control
Younger men
1995 -0.12 -1.83 21.1 5870 59051
1995-97 -0.09 -1.33 21.8 4937 48172
1995-99 -0.29 -2.83 22.0 4409 43025
Younger women
1995 -0.24 -2.88 21.1 5870 59051
1995-97 -0.26 -2.76 21.8 4937 48172
1995-99 -0.45 -3.23 22.0 4409 43025
Older men
1995 0.00 0.00 21.1 5870 59051
1995-97 -0.12 -1.48 21.8 4937 48172
1995-99 -0.17 -1.16 22.0 4409 43025
Older women
1995 -0.16 -1.99 21.1 5870 59051
1995-97 -0.21 -1.62 21.8 4937 48172
1995-99 -0.36 -2.88 22.0 4409 43025
Notes: Source: Own calculations based on Quadros de Pessoal. ATT refers to the average treatment
eect in terms of the worker ow considered and at the year under analysis. t(ATT) denotes
analytical standard errors. Estimation is carried out using xed eects. Estimates are based on the
dierence in the accumulated level of the worker ows from 1995 until the year under analysis and
the base year, 1992. Treatment and Control indicates the number of rms assigned to the treatment
and control groups respectively.
27Table 9: Eects on Flows, Probit Pscore, Only Continuing Firms
Year ATT t(ATT) Size Treated Control
Hirings
1995 -0.70 -3.17 21.7 3442 34483
1995-97 -0.94 -2.77 21.7 3442 34483
1995-99 -0.71 -2.25 21.7 3442 34483
Separations
1995 -0.84 -4.12 21.7 3442 34483
1995-97 -0.95 -4.18 21.7 3442 34483
1995-99 -0.78 -3.02 21.7 3442 34483
Net job creation
1995 0.14 0.56 21.7 3442 34483
1995-97 0.02 0.05 21.7 3442 34483
1995-99 0.07 0.21 21.7 3442 34483
Notes: Source: Own calculations based on Quadros de Pessoal. ATT refers to the average treatment
eect in terms of the worker ow considered and at the year under analysis. t(ATT) denotes
analytical standard errors. Estimation is carried out using xed eects. Estimates are based on the
dierence in the accumulated level of the worker ows from 1995 until the year under analysis and
the base year, 1992. Treatment and Control indicates the number of rms assigned to the treatment
and control groups respectively.
28Table 10: Eects on Sales, Probit Pscore, Only Continuing Firms
Year ATT t(ATT) Size Treated Control
Sales
1995 -0.05 -2.12 21.7 2800 28026
1995-97 -0.05 -2.02 21.7 2800 28026
1995-99 -0.08 -3.33 21.7 2800 28026
Sales per worker
1995 -0.04 -1.96 21.7 2800 28026
1995-97 -0.02 -1.04 21.7 2800 28026
1995-99 -0.03 -1.15 21.7 2800 28026
Notes: Source: Own calculations based on Quadros de Pessoal. ATT refers to the average treatment
eect in terms of the worker ow considered and at the year under analysis. t(ATT) denotes
analytical standard errors. Estimation is carried out using xed eects. Estimates are based on the
dierence in the accumulated level of the worker ows from 1995 until the year under analysis and
the base year, 1992. Treatment and Control indicates the number of rms assigned to the treatment
and control groups respectively.
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